Video Briefing

IMI Daily: Which Countries Won’t Extradite Citizens?

Oct 9, 2026Video Briefing13:50Watch on YouTube

Extradition of a country’s own citizens is governed by a mix of constitutional prohibitions, ordinary statutes and international treaties. While many civil‑law states embed an absolute ban in their constitutions, common‑law jurisdictions generally rely on statutes and treaties, allowing more flexibility. Recent reforms in several Latin American nations show the list of states that refuse to surrender their nationals is shrinking, and the practical value of a second passport for avoiding extradition is limited.

Constitutional versus statutory bans

Country Legal basis Main features
Russia Article 61 of the Constitution Absolute ban – no treaty or crime exception.
Brazil 1988 Constitution (native‑born) + 2017 migration law No extradition of native‑born; naturalised citizens can be extradited for crimes committed before naturalisation or proven drug‑trafficking involvement.
Turkey Article 38 of the Constitution No extradition for any citizen; only a dormant exception for obligations to the International Criminal Court (which Turkey has not joined).
China Extradition law Refuses surrender of Chinese nationals.
Japan Extradition Act Bars surrender unless a treaty provides otherwise; discretion left to the government.
Germany Article 16 of the Basic Law Absolute ban, but parliament may allow extradition to EU member states and international courts (e.g., European Arrest Warrant).
Switzerland Article 25 of the Constitution Extradition of a Swiss citizen requires the person’s consent.
Italy 1983 treaty with the United States No national‑based refusal; treaty obliges both sides to extradite.

Statutory bans can be overridden by treaty obligations. Where a ban is written into ordinary law rather than the constitution, a subsequent treaty can supersede it without a constitutional amendment.

Recent reforms and practice

  • Costa Rica (2025 reform, applied March 2026) opened Article 32 to allow extradition for international drug trafficking and terrorism. By June 2026, 23 Costa Ricans faced U.S. extradition requests; a bill filed in August 2026 seeks to add money‑laundering, human‑trafficking, migrant smuggling and contract killing to the list, requiring a two‑stage super‑majority (38 of 57 deputies).
  • Ecuador lifted its constitutional ban by referendum on 21 April 2024; in July 2025 it extradited gang leader José Adulo Masías to the United States.
  • Colombia amended Article 35 in 1997, permitting extradition of its nationals; the previous government signed 913 extraditions to 31 countries, over 560 to the United States.
  • Mexico (Feb 2025 – Jan 2026) transferred 92 cartel defendants to the United States under its national security law, bypassing the 1978 extradition treaty; defendants had no right to appeal after landing.
  • EU‑UK post‑Brexit: the EU’s December 2025 notification lists nine member states (Germany, Greece, France, Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden) that will not surrender their own nationals under any circumstance; Austria and the Czech Republic require consent; Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Malta attach no nationality condition. Poland now allows surrender of its nationals for offenses committed abroad (effective 3 Aug 2023).

Record of actual extraditions

  • France has not extradited a French citizen outside the European Arrest Warrant framework since the 19th century.
  • Russia refused a 2007 British request for Andre Lugavoy (pelonium poisoning) and has otherwise a clean record.
  • Brazil extradited Claudia Hurig to the United States in 2018 after she lost Brazilian nationality by acquiring U.S. citizenship; it also enforced a 9‑year sentence on former footballer Robinho after a 2024 Brazilian court decision.
  • Lebanon surrendered Ali Salame in 2019 on the basis of his American citizenship.
  • Jordan has refused U.S. requests since 2017 for Alam Alamimi (2001 Jerusalem bombing).
  • Italy initially refused to extradite Robinho but later arranged for Brazil to enforce the sentence; an Italian appeals court in March 2026 ruled that former Brazilian congresswoman Carla Zambelli’s Italian passport did not block surrender, though the case was later halted over fair‑trial concerns.

How protection is tested

  1. Timing of nationality – If a person acquires citizenship after the alleged offense, many states (e.g., France, Brazil) consider the protection inapplicable.
  2. Dual nationality – Holding another citizenship can override protection, as seen with Lebanon’s surrender of Ali Salame (U.S. citizen) and the Italian court’s handling of Zambelli.
  3. Case outcome – Refusal to extradite rarely ends the prosecution; most treaties require the refusing state to prosecute domestically or enforce the foreign sentence (e.g., EU‑UK treaty, Swiss practice).

Citizenship‑by‑investment (CBI) programmes and extradition

  • Caribbean CBI states (Antigua & Barbuda, St. Kitts & Nevis, etc.) follow British common‑law tradition; nationality is not a ground for refusal. Example: Mahul Choxy, naturalised in 2017, was promised extradition by Antigua’s prime minister after India’s request.
  • Vanuatu allows the Attorney‑General discretion to refuse surrender on citizenship grounds; the government has revoked citizenships to avoid extradition (e.g., March 2025 cancellation of Lit Mod’s passport).
  • Turkey offers the strongest textual protection (Article 38) covering all citizens, including investors, but revocation of investor passports (6,134 in Aug 2026) shows the protection can be removed.
  • Jordan protects nationals constitutionally, yet investor passports are temporary (first three years) and can be revoked, as happened to Prince Group chairman Chenzu in Dec 2025.

Practical implications

  • Acquiring a second passport rarely guarantees immunity from extradition; the decisive factors are the existence of a bilateral treaty, the timing of citizenship acquisition, and any dual nationality.
  • States with constitutional bans can still surrender nationals by amending the constitution or by revoking the citizenship altogether—both routes may require a parliamentary super‑majority.
  • When a ban is statutory rather than constitutional, a treaty can override it without constitutional change.
  • Even where nationality is not a formal barrier, the requesting state’s evidence and treaty compliance are scrutinised, and courts may take years to assess political motivation or fairness of trial.

Overall, the trend is toward narrowing the pool of countries that categorically refuse to extradite their own citizens, while the protective value of investor‑oriented citizenships remains limited and subject to revocation.